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A B S T R A C T   
This paper explores whether asset market equilibria in cryptocurrency markets do exist. In doing 
so, it distinguishes between privacy and non-privacy coins. Most recently, privacy coins have 
attracted increasing attention in the public debate as non-privacy cryptocurrencies, such as Bit-
coin, do not satisfy some users’ demands for anonymity. Analyzing ten cryptocurrencies with the 
highest market capitalization in each submarket in the 2016–2018 periods, we find that privacy 
coins exhibit a distinct market equilibrium. Contributing to the current debate on the market 
efficiency of cryptocurrency markets, our findings provide evidence of market inefficiency. 
Moreover, the asset market equilibrium of privacy coins appears to originate from non-privacy 
coins with highest market capitalizations. We argue that the reason for this finding could be 
that non-privacy coins may be the first choice for criminals who might prefer cryptocurrencies 
exhibiting both a high level of anonymity and liquidity.   
1. Introduction 
Recently, empirical investigations of cryptocurrency markets have attracted considerable attention in the academic literature. This 
is not surprising given that from an economic perspective the sums of money involved are substantial (Fry and Cheah, 2016, p.350). 
Bitcoin (BTC), Ethereum (ETH), and Ripple (XRP) are among the top three cryptocurrencies with the highest market capitalization2. 
Interestingly, in recent years, another type of cryptocurrency, exemplified by Monero (XMR), Dash (DASH), and Verge (XVG) came 
into existence claiming to provide transaction privacy and account balance privacy to their users that the public blockchains like BTC, 
ETH or XRP do not provide. Androulaki, Karame, Roeschlin, Scherer, and Capkun (2013) argue that almost 40% of Bitcoin users could 
be identified despite the privacy measures in place; today, however, virtually all Bitcoin users could be identified. Goldfeder, Kalodner, 
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Reisman, and Narayanan (2018) show how third-party web trackers can de-anonymize users of cryptocurrencies.3 By implementing 
sophisticated cryptographic protocols, privacy coins can hide senders and receivers addresses as well as the transaction amount while 
executing each transaction. The complete financial transparency of Bitcoin and other non-privacy coins is deterring many institutional 
and private investors from adopting these decentralized cryptocurrencies (Liu, Li, Karame and Asokan, 2018). The website Bitinfo-
charts provides user level, account balance level and transaction level information for the top 100 richest wallet addresses of fourteen 
different cryptocurrencies4. Non-privacy coins like Bitcoin are fully transparent; therefore, institutions are hesitant to use it as a 
medium of exchange. Baur, Hong, and Lee (2018) show that Bitcoins are mainly used as a speculative asset rather than as a medium of 
exchange. 
An alternative is presented by Brenig, Accorsi, and Müller (2015) who outline the structure of a money laundering process and anti- 
money-laundering controls to examine whether cryptocurrencies constitute a driver for money laundering or not. The study argues that 
privacy coins have potential benefits for criminals; an important yet neglected factor in the circulation of cryptocurrencies as a money 
laundering instrument. In this regard, Kethineni and Cao (2020) support Brenig et al. (2015) and argue that cryptocurrencies became the 
currency of choice for many drug dealers and extortionists because of the opportunities to hide behind the assumed privacy and anonymity. 
Privacy coins also use the decentralized public blockchain, but by using many features like masternode technology, ring signature, and 
a stealth wallet address, privacy coins make it impossible for third parties to trace transactions to the real parties involved. Privacy coins 
are different from non-privacy coins not only in the cryptographic level, but probably also at the user level. One reason why a separate user 
base for privacy coins might be growing could be due to the complete transparency of non-privacy coins like BTC and ETH. A certain 
degree of financial privacy about transaction and balance may be important for both the institutional and individual users. Therefore, one 
can hypothesize that the traders who favor privacy over complete transparency are emerging as a different subgroup in digital financial 
markets. Since the total supply of cryptocurrencies is (in most cases) predetermined, the price processes of cryptocurrencies depend solely 
on the demand side (e.g., the users). As a consequence, if the user base for privacy coins is different from that for non-privacy coins, we 
would expect that each submarket of cryptocurrencies potentially forms an individual asset market equilibrium. 
Hence, we hypothesize that privacy coins form a distinct submarket in the cryptocurrency market. Following Urquhart (2016), 
Dyhrberg (2016), Bouri, Molnár, Azzi, Roubaud, and Hagfors (2017), who adopt the perspective that cryptocurrencies are an asset 
market, we consider the privacy and non-privacy coin markets to be two different asset markets. We explore whether market equilibria 
in cryptocurrency markets exist which, in turn, would imply the existence of submarkets. In this regard, we explicitly test whether 
privacy coins form such a distinct submarket in the cryptocurrency market. In doing so, we also investigate the efficiency of the overall 
cryptocurrency market. A test for market efficiency that does not require the specific formulation of an equilibrium price mechanism 
goes back to an argument by Granger (1986): If two or more asset prices show a stable common relationship in the long-run, it is 
possible that the movement of one asset price is linked to the movement of other asset prices. In turn, the price of one asset does not 
only depend on its own past prices but also on the history of a different asset’s prices. As a consequence, the weak-form of market 
efficiency is violated (Richards, 1995, p.632). In line with Engle and Granger’s (1987) cointegration theory, we employ Johansen’s 
(1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1994, 1995) multivariate methodology to model and test the long-term equilibrium process. Specifically, if the 
stable long-run relationship between asset prices is known to the market participants they are able to exploit them to make excess 
profits (Copeland, 1991, p. 187). 
This paper contributes to the literature in several important ways. On the one hand, Urquhart (2016) and Al-Yahyaee, Mensi, and 
Yoon (2018) studied the market efficiency of Bitcoin and found the cryptocurrency to be inefficient; however, Nadarajah and Chu 
(2017) revisited Urquhart’s (2016) paper and found that Bitcoin returns do satisfy the efficient market hypothesis. Moreover, Vidal- 
Tomás and Ibañez (2018) and Sensoy (2019) argue that Bitcoin has become more efficient over time, whereas Bariviera’s (2017) 
findings suggest Bitcoin has met the standards of informational efficiency since 2014. The different views in the literature indicate 
there is no consensus on the market efficiency of cryptocurrencies. While the past papers cited above consider a single asset (e.g., 
Bitcoin) our paper adds to this strand of literature by taking a market-wide perspective. In doing so, we consider a whole set of 
cryptocurrencies that exhibit the largest market capitalization and employ Johansen’s (1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1994, 1995) multivariate 
cointegration methodology to explore whether or not asset market equilibria in line with Engle and Granger’s (1987) cointegration 
theory exist. 
There is also a new strand of literature emerging that discusses the features of privacy and non-privacy coins. This literature 
however mostly adopts a technological perspective and explores the privacy implications of Bitcoin (Androulaki et al., 2013), iden-
tification of a particular user’s blockchain transactions (Goldfeder et al., 2018, Khalilov and Levi 2018), technological interventions 
that could address the privacy issues of cryptocurrencies (Ouaddah, Elkalam, and Ouahman, 2017; Kopp, Mödinger, Hauck, Kargl, and 
Bösch, 2017), and potential failures to guarantee privacy in terms of unlinkability and untraceability (Kumar, Fischer, Tople, and 
Saxena, 2017; Möser et al., 2017). Inspired by Fry and Cheah (2016) and Osterrieder and Lorenz (2017) who discuss the need for 
academic research on cryptocurrency from a financial point of view, our paper adopts the financial perspective and considers the 
cryptocurrency market as an asset market comprising two submarkets, the privacy coin market and the non-privacy coin market. This 
is the first paper that explicitly explores the existence of cointegration relationships among asset prices in the cryptocurrency market. 
Finally, there is a wide strand of literature performing market efficiency tests using cointegration analysis of traditional currencies. 
3 Third parties typically receive user information for advertising purposes even if users pay via cryptocurrencies, which is enough to identify that 
particular user’s blockchain transactions. By linking the user’s cookie to that particular blockchain transaction, one can identify the real user behind 
it.  
4 https://bitinfocharts.com, accessed on 18.3.2019 
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Studies that also employ multivariate cointegration analysis as a methodological framework for exploring the European Monetary 
System (EMS) are Norrbin (1996), Woo (1999), Haug, MacKinnon, and Michels (2000), Rangvid and Sørensen (2002), and Aroskar, 
Sarkar, and Swanson (2004). Interestingly, those studies are mostly able to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration for the EMS 
currencies. No paper has explicitly examined cryptocurrency markets for cointegration.5 Hence, our paper extends the literature to 
reveal potential cointegration equilibria in new digital currency markets. 
Our results show strong evidence for the existence of four cointegration relationships in the market for cryptocurrencies. Our 
evidence suggests that the privacy coin market forms a distinct asset market equilibrium. Employing ten large cap cryptocurrencies 
with privacy function and ten non-privacy cryptocurrencies in a joint model, we use a fully-specified Vector-Error-Correction Model 
(VECM) to estimate the four distinct cointegration equilibria. To do so, we employ from both groups of cryptocurrencies (e.g., privacy 
and non-privacy coins) those cryptocurrencies that exhibit the respective highest and lowest market capitalizations as left-hand side 
variables. Using Dash (DASH) as the privacy coin with highest market capitalization, we find that only two non-privacy coins, Peercoin 
(PPC) and MaidSafeCoin (MAID), exhibit t-statistics indicating statistical significance on a common 5% level. 
On the other hand, six out of eight privacy coins exhibit t-statistics indicating statistical significance on at least a 5% level, which 
strongly suggests that this distinct market equilibrium is primarily driven by privacy coins. A joint test for exploring whether or not 
non-privacy coins are a part of that cointegration relationship shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis, implying that DASH is a 
part of a submarket equilibrium consisting of privacy coins that is statistically unrelated to non-privacy coins. Our results are in line 
with the literature offering evidence of cointegration equilibria in traditional currency markets such as the European Monetary System 
(Norrbin, 1996; Woo, 1999; Haug et al., 2000; Rangvid and Sørensen, 2002; Aroskar, Sarkar, and Swanson, 2004). The presence of 
cointegration equilibria is also in line with Urquhart (2016) and Al-Yahyaee, Mensi, and Yoon (2018), who argue that Bitcoin is 
inefficient because a cointegration relationship implies weak-form market inefficiency. Finally, our results provide some new evidence 
on market heterogeneity: Privacy coins with high market capitalizations appear to build a submarket of cryptocurrencies as they form 
their own market equilibrium that is unrelated to the remaining cointegration equilibria in the cryptocurrency market. This market 
heterogeneity phenomenon in the cryptocurrency market may be subject to future investigations. 
2. Background 
Alexander and Dimitriu (2005) investigate the performance of a cointegration-based index tracking strategy and, by this, test the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), as according to Jensen’s (1978) definition of efficient markets, a trading strategy producing 
significant risk-adjusted payoffs is evidence against the EMH. In this regard, Alexander and Dimitriu (2005, p.215) argue that “the 
rationale for constructing portfolios based on a cointegration relationship with the benchmark, rather than correlation, rests on the 
following features of cointegration: the price difference between the benchmark and the replica portfolio is, by construction, sta-
tionary; the stock weights, being based on a large amount of history, have an enhanced stability; finally, there is a full use of the 
information contained in level variables such as stock prices”. As pointed out in Alexander and Dimitriu (2005), assets in price levels 
contain a higher level of information as opposed to returns. Note that a cointegration relationship is based on an ‘historical equilib-
rium’, that is, a price equilibrium estimated from a long historical sample. In this cointegration equilibrium, exogenous crypto-
currencies and endogenous cryptocurrencies share a common stochastic trend that is stationary and mean-reverting. Whereas 
exogenous cryptocurrencies follow their own stochastic evolutions, endogenous cryptocurrencies adjust to deviations from the long- 
term equilibrium condition as defined by the cointegration vector. A cointegration relationship is evidence against the EMH because 
traders could gain profits by exploiting the mean-reverting characteristic defined by a cointegration relationship. In this regard, we 
follow Alexander and Dimitriu (2005) and test the EMH in the market for cryptocurrencies. In doing so, our paper contributes to the 
literature on testing the market efficiency of cryptocurrency markets using cointegration theory (Engle and Granger’s, 1987). 
Furthermore, Borri’s (2019) study indicates that cryptocurrency returns are highly correlated one with the other. However, she 
finds that using cryptocurrency portfolios may substantially reduce idiosyncratic risk and may offer better risk-adjusted and condi-
tional returns than individual cryptocurrencies. In this regard, it is interesting to note that Borri (2019) does not study cryptocurrency 
portfolios that form submarkets within the overall cryptocurrency ecosystem. Using popular moving average strategies, a recent study 
from Ahmed, Grobys, Sapkota (2020) explores the profitability of technical trading rules implemented among cryptocurrencies with 
privacy function. Averaging the average returns across the entire set of cryptocurrencies with privacy function, they did not find any 
positive average portfolio returns in excess of the equally-weighted average buy-and-hold portfolio. This is a surprising finding because 
earlier literature suggests that technical trading rules are profitable for cryptocurrency markets (Grobys et al., 2020; Gerritsen et al., 
2020; Corbet et al., 2019; Miller et al., 2019). Ahmed et al.’s (2020) study does not include any fully elaborated dynamic general 
equilibrium asset-pricing models to assess whether the reported payoffs are merely the equilibrium rents that accrue to investors 
willing to carry the risks associated with such strategies (Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang, 2000) and, hence, encourages studies to discern the 
economic sources of return differentials among cryptocurrency submarkets. Our study contributes to this strand of literature by taking 
an important next step by exploring whether statistical equilibriums in cryptocurrency submarkets do exist. 
Moreover, we note that Ahmed et al.’s (2020) study provides some evidence for that the market forces driving the market for 
cryptocurrencies with privacy function are somewhat different from those that drive the overall cryptocurrency market. It is inter-
esting to note that recent research suggests that about half of Bitcoin transactions is associated with criminal activities such as drugs, 
5 Other relevant papers that document mixed results are Jeon and Seo (2003) and Phengpis (2006), who examine structural instability in 
particular and investigate currency crises for market efficiency. 





Top 10 Privacy and Non-privacy Coins.  
Panel A: Top 10 Non-Privacy Coins 
S.No Non-Privacy 
Coin 
Symbol January 3, 










3 Years’ Market 
Capitalization 
Growth%  
Bitcoin BTC 1 6,467,437,080 1 67,475,512,827  943.31 
1 Ripple XRP 2 201,799,631 2 15,076,740,856  7371.14 
2 Litecoin LTC 3 152,873,521 7 1,912,263,648  1150.90 
3 Ethereum ETH 4 73,843,278 3 14,560,066,114  19617.52 
4 Dogecoin DOGE 6 14,940,681 23 278,470,304  1763.84 
5 Peercoin PPC 7 9,756,959 181 14,254,314  46.10 
6 BitShares BTS 8 8,591,688 44 106,520,276  1139.81 
7 Stellar XLM 9 8,436,465 6 2,250,048,215  26570.51 
8 Nxt NXT 10 6,863,998 113 29,426,627  328.71 
9 MaidSafeCoin MAID 11 6,789,470 65 61,335,019  803.38 





Panel B: Top 10 Privacy Coins 
S.No Privacy Coin 
Name       
1 Dash DASH 5 19,794,713 15 698,091,183  3426.65 
2 Bytecoin BCN 14 5,582,979 38 134,517,567  2309.42 
3 Monero XMR 15 5,295,952 13 806,939,516  15136.91 
4 DigitalNote XDN 51 447,057 252 8,565,009  1815.87 
5 CloakCoin CLOAK 125 201,995 318 6,249,733  2994.00 
6 Aeon AEON 137 137,088 393 4,475,790  3164.90 
7 NavCoin NAV 142 121,805 213 11,127,542  9035.54 
8 Verge XVG 149 109,968 43 110,307,808  100209.00 
9 Stealth XST 161 8352 515 2,539,074  30300.79 
10 Prime-XI PXI 322 8889 1701 4236  − 52.35        
Average  16834.07 
Note: This table reports the top 11 non-privacy coins (including Bitcoin) and top ten privacy coins based on their market capitalization as of January 3, 2016. There were 572 cryptocurrencies available 
(including both privacy and non-privacy coins) as of January 3, 2016, and 2073 coins as of December 30, 2018. Coin Rank shows the position based on a coin’s market capitalization. Three Years’ Market 
Capitalization Growth shows the percentage growth in market capitalization from January 3, 2016 until December 30, 2018. Panel A shows the top 11 non-privacy coins and Panel B shows the top ten 
privacy coins in terms of market capitalization (Source: coinmarketcap.com/historical/). 
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for instance (Foley, Karlsen, Putniņš, 2019). Because Bitcoin is a non-privacy coin, Ahmed et al. (2020) argue that the only option how 
market participants might achieve (full) anonymity is via the dark web. On the other hand, the usage of the dark web is per se a 
criminal offence; as a consequence, traders might prefer choosing privacy coins for their transactions instead of non-privacy coins. 
“This enables users making transactions in cryptocurrency (e.g., privacy coins) in the legal world-wide-web domain while still meeting 
their demands for legal transfers of digital currency, security, and confidentiality through anonymous transactions. Moreover, such 
security features may be of considerable importance for traders from countries where economic and political freedom is limited.” 
(Ahmed et al., 2020). Since the price of cryptocurrencies is in most cases (due to the limited supply) driven by the demand side, we 
hypothesize in line with Ahmed et al. (2020) that market participants engaging in criminal activities shift their demand from non- 
privacy to privacy cryptocurrencies. If those market participants constituted a distinct user base it would imply that a potential 
market equilibrium in the submarket for cryptocurrencies exhibiting the privacy function should consequently be detached from the 
market equilibrium formed by non-privacy cryptocurrencies. Motivated by this literature, we take a novel perspective using cointe-
gration theory to explore whether distinct market equilibria in those two different cryptocurrency submarkets do exist. 
3. Methodology 
For each group—privacy and non-privacy coins—we retrieved daily closing prices6 for ten cryptocurrencies that exhibit the highest 
market capitalization as of January 3, 2016. We also downloaded data for Bitcoin, which dominates the cryptocurrency market. Our 
sample is from January 1, 2016 until December 31, 2018 accounting for 1096 daily observations. For all asset prices we compound the 
log-price series that we used in the following analyses. The trend in data levels of non-privacy and privacy coins are reported in Fig. A1 
and Fig. A2 in the appendix. 
Table 1 illustrates that at the beginning of our sample period, the average market capitalization of non-privacy coins (excluding 
Bitcoin) is about 19 times larger than that of privacy coins. Interestingly, the three-year growth in market capitalization of these top ten 
cryptocurrencies in each category is about three times higher for privacy coins than for non-privacy coins. This suggests that the 
relative popularity of privacy coins has increased over time. Even though both privacy and non-privacy categories of cryptocurrencies 
use the decentralized public blockchain technology, they differ on other technological levels, particularly in relation to either the 
public node, wallet form, or the signature. Privacy coins also differ from non-privacy coins in terms of their usage. People who use non- 
privacy coins face complete financial transparency which might be less appealing in a competitive environment. Traders might want to 
maintain a certain degree of financial privacy at both the transaction and account balance level. Thus, we hypothesize that, as in-
dependent players emerge in digital currency markets, privacy coins form a distinct submarket. 
To investigate whether or not distinct market equilibria, forming submarkets in the overall cryptocurrency market, exist and to 
explore how they relate to each other, the first step of our empirical analysis is to identify whether or not our set of cryptocurrencies 
exhibits stationarity. This is an important step because cointegration equilibria require that the input variables are integrated of order 
one, that is, I(1) stochastic processes. To test the order of integration, we follow the common literature and employ the well-known 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root test (Dickey-Fuller, 1979). The model for estimating the test statistics is given by: 
Table 2 
ADF tests for privacy and non-privacy coins.  
Privacy coins Non-privacy coins  
Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2 
Coin Interceptª Lagsd Intercept and trendb Lagsd Coin Interceptª Lagsd Intercept and trendb Lagsd 
DASH − 1.79 0  0.25 0 XRP − 0.99 2 − 1.19 2 
BCN − 1.34 1  − 0.90 1 LTC − 1.13 0 − 0.23 0 
XDN − 1.39 0  − 0.91 0 ETH − 2.93** 0 − 0.63 0 
XMR − 2.16 0  − 0.15 0 DOGE − 1.30 0 − 1.41 0 
CLOAK − 1.51 2  − 0.72 2 PPC − 1.43 0 − 1.18 0 
AEON − 1.46 1  − 0.57 1 BTS − 1.24 0 − 0.41 0 
XST − 1.49 1  − 1.45 1 XLM − 0.93 1 − 1.45 1 
PXI − 1.44 2  − 1.16 2 NXT − 1.37 0 − 0.62 0 
NAV − 1.86 4  − 0.60 4 MAID − 2.86** 0 − 1.69 1 
XVG − 1.23 4  − 1.27 4 NMC − 1.65 1 − 1.59 1      
BTC − 1.31 0 − 0.06 0 
Note: This table reports the results for Augmented Dickey Fuller tests of the daily price series in logs for privacy and non-privacy coins. Model 1 
accounts for an intercept in the test regression, whereas model 2 accounts for both an intercept and trend term. The sample period is from January 1, 
2016 until December 31, 2018 corresponding to 1096 observations. 
**Statistically significant on a 5% level. 
ªCritical values for 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels are − 2.57, − 2.86 and − 3.44. 
bCritical values for 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels are − 3.13, − 3.41 and − 3.97. 
dLag-order is chosen by using the Schwarz info criterion. The maximum lag length is chosen by default is 21. 
6 Because cryptocurrencies are traded 24/7, coinmarketcap.com takes the latest data in the range (UTC time) to determine the closing price. 
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Δpi,t = δ0,i+ δ1,it+ δ2,ipi,t− 1 +
∑T
j=1
δ2+j,iΔpi,t− j + εi,t (1)  
where pi,t denotes the log-price of cryptocurrency i at time t, δ0 is the corresponding estimate for the intercept of the regression, δ1 is the 
corresponding estimate for the time trend t, δ2+j is the estimate for the lagged differences in log prices of lag 2+j where j = 1,⋯,T, εt 
denotes a white-noise error term, and the parameter δ2 is assumed to be zero under the null hypothesis. Under the null hypothesis, pi,t is 
an I(1) stochastic process. Given our research context, we assume stationarity under the alternative hypothesis. Moreover, we follow a 
common practice by choosing the lag-order j with respect to the Schwarz criterion. 
Specifically, under some circumstances, a linear combination of some I(1) processes becomes a stationary process, that is, an I(0) 
process. According to Granger (1986), and Engle and Granger (1987), those k = 1,⋯,K stochastic processes are said to be co- 
integrated of order (1, …, 1), denoted as CI(1, …, 1). To test the order of cointegration, we employ the trace test using the overall 
set of K = 20 cryptocurrencies, consisting of ten privacy coins and ten non-privacy coins, given by: 








where λj are the eigenvalues obtained by applying Reduced Rank (RR) regression techniques to the fully unrestricted Vector-Error 
Correction model (VECM) (Johansen 1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1994, 1995) given by: 
Δyt − μ1 = Π(yt− 1 − μ0 − μ1(t − 1) )+
∑p− 1
j=1
Γj(Δyt− 1 − μ1)+ ut (3)  
where the 20x1 vector Δyt contains the log-returns of cryptocurrencies i = {1,2,⋯,19,20}.
7 Moreover, μ0 and μ1 denote constant and 
trend, Π and Γ1, Γ2, …, Γp− 1 are KxK parameter matrices. The trace test tests the sequence of hypotheses given by: 
Table 3 
Trace test excluding Bitcoin.  
Rank Eigenvalue Trace test p-value Lmax test p-value 
0  0.1390  1094.7000  [0.0000]  163.7500  [0.0000] 
1  0.1227  931.0000  [0.0000]  143.2300  [0.0001] 
2  0.0926  787.7700  [0.0043]  106.3600  [0.2285] 
3  0.0830  681.4100  [0.0402]  94.7980  [0.4534] 
4  0.0752  586.6200  [0.1597]  85.4960  [0.6187] 
5  0.0676  501.1200  [0.3743]  76.5640  [0.7612] 
6  0.0526  424.5500  [0.6062]  59.0730  [0.9899] 
7  0.0519  365.4800  [0.6468]  58.2950  [0.9560] 
8  0.0491  307.1900  [0.7431]  55.1160  [0.9217] 
9  0.0407  252.0700  [0.8473]  45.4780  [0.9817] 
10  0.0386  206.5900  [0.8753]  43.0240  [0.9529] 
11  0.0303  163.5700  [0.9204]  33.6620  [0.9921] 
12  0.0265  129.9100  [0.9093]  29.4100  [0.9895] 
13  0.0243  100.5000  [0.8892]  26.9620  [0.9671] 
14  0.0233  73.5350  [0.8887]  25.8330  [0.8615] 
15  0.0140  47.7020  [0.9404]  15.4110  [0.9891] 
16  0.0130  32.2900  [0.8650]  14.2800  [0.9204] 
17  0.0104  18.0110  [0.8192]  11.4910  [0.8060] 
18  0.0052  6.5194  [0.8243]  5.7163  [0.8390] 
19  0.0007  0.8031  [0.3702]  0.8031  [0.3702] 
Note: This table reports the results for the trace test for cointegration applied to a set of twenty cryptocurrencies consisting of ten privacy coins and 
ten non-privacy coins (excluding Bitcoin) exhibiting the highest market capitalization as of Jan 3, 2016. Our model uses daily data of log prices. The 
test statistic allows for linear deterministic trend in data. The model is estimated with the econometric software Gretl. The sample period is from 
January 1, 2016 until December 31, 2018 corresponding to 1096 observations. 
Johansen test: 
Number of equations = 20 
Lag order = 2 
Estimation period: 2016-01-03-2018-12-31 (T = 1094) 
Case 5: Unrestricted trend and constant 
Log-likelihood = 45917.6 (including constant term: 42813) 
7 The model is more detailed in Lütkepohl, Krätzig, and Phillips (2004, p.114). 
N. Sapkota and K. Grobys                                                                                                                                                                                           
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions & Money 74 (2021) 101402
7
H0(0) : rank(Π) = 0 versus H1(0) : rank(Π) > 0,
H0(1) : rank(Π) = 1 versus H1(0) : rank(Π) > 1,
⋮
H0(K − 1) : rank(Π) = K − 1 versus H1(K − 1) : rank(Π) = K.
The corresponding cointegration rank is selected when the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for the first time.8 If a cointegration 
relationship of order r exists, the matrix Π has a reduced rank form and can be decomposed into αβ’, where α and β are Kxr matrices. In 
this regard, the term, 
β’(yt− 1 − μ0 − μ1(t − 1) )
contains the cointegration equilibrium relationships, whereas α is the loading matrix. Each cryptocurrency in submarket r that has an 
insignificant weight attached to the respective cointegration relationship is said to be exogenous as it does not respond to disturbances 
of the long-term equilibrium. If cointegration holds, the linear combination conditioned by the matrix 
β results in r stationary stochastic processes that are mean-reverting. While exogenous cryptocurrencies entering the respective 
cointegration equilibrium do not mean-revert, those cryptocurrencies that are endogenous adjust to deviations from the long-term 
equilibrium defined by β (via mean-reversion). Corresponding significant loadings in the matrix α suggest endogeneity. Traders 
could exploit this pattern by betting on this mean-reversion property. As pointed out in Alexander and Dimitriu (2005), the presence of 
a cointegration relationship is evidence against the EMH because traders could gain profits by exploiting the mean-reverting char-
acteristic defined by a cointegration relationship. 
4. Results 
The results of testing the order of integration are presented in Table 2. Initially imposing the restriction δ1,i = 0, we find that none 
of the privacy coins appears to be stationary, whereas the null hypothesis is rejected for only two non-privacy coins (e.g., Ethereum and 
MaidSafeCoin). However, when estimating the fully unrestricted ADF test—involving testing a random walk with drift under the null 
hypothesis against a trend-stationary process under the alternative—we find that all cryptocurrencies appear to be I(1). This result is in 
line with the earlier literature indicating that Bitcoin is an I(1) process (Urquhart, 2016). 
Table 4 
Trace test including Bitcoin.  
Rank Eigenvalue Trace test p-value Lmax test p-value 
0  0.1408  1196.4000  [0.0000]  166.0300  [0.0000] 
1  0.1268  1030.4000  [0.0000]  148.3400  [0.0002] 
2  0.1057  882.0600  [0.0015]  122.1900  [0.0407] 
3  0.0873  759.8800  [0.0344]  99.9500  [0.4744] 
4  0.0821  659.9300  [0.1408]  93.7200  [0.5010] 
5  0.0693  566.2100  [0.3807]  78.5400  [0.8712] 
6  0.0632  487.6700  [0.5692]  71.4400  [0.9119] 
7  0.0520  416.2300  [0.7268]  58.4500  [0.9921] 
8  0.0498  357.7800  [0.7611]  55.9000  [0.9797] 
9  0.0422  301.8800  [0.8170]  47.1600  [0.9955] 
10  0.0393  254.7300  [0.8125]  43.8500  [0.9906] 
11  0.0384  210.8800  [0.8174]  42.8300  [0.9558] 
12  0.0332  168.0500  [0.8682]  36.9300  [0.9671] 
13  0.0256  131.1200  [0.8939]  28.3400  [0.9940] 
14  0.0245  102.7900  [0.8492]  27.0900  [0.9653] 
15  0.0239  75.7000  [0.8440]  26.5700  [0.8288] 
16  0.0170  49.1400  [0.9169]  18.7900  [0.9322] 
17  0.0126  30.3400  [0.9183]  13.9100  [0.9331] 
18  0.0092  16.4300  [0.8896]  10.0300  [0.8961] 
19  0.0050  6.4000  [0.8346]  5.5400  [0.8541] 
20  0.0008  0.8600  [0.3548]  0.8600  [0.3548] 
Note: This table reports the results for the trace test for cointegration applied to a set of twenty-one cryptocurrencies consisting ten privacy coins and 
eleven non-privacy coins (including Bitcoin) exhibiting the highest market capitalization as of Jan 3, 2016. Our model uses daily data of log prices. 
The test statistic allows for linear deterministic trend in data. The model is estimated with the econometric software Gretl. The sample period is from 
January 1, 2016 until December 31, 2018 corresponding to 1096 observations. 
Johansen test: 
Number of equations = 21 
Lag order = 2 
Estimation period: 2016-01-03-2018-12-31 (T = 1094) 
Case 5: Unrestricted trend and constant 
Log-likelihood = 49307.7 (including constant term: 46203.1) 
8 Using the general-to-specific rule, we made use of the fully unrestricted VECM as given in Eq. (3). 
N. Sapkota and K. Grobys                                                                                                                                                                                           
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions & Money 74 (2021) 101402
8
We employ the Akaike criterion (AIC), Schwarz Bayesian criterion (BIC) and the Hannan-Quinn criterion (HQC), to assess the 
optimal lag-length od the Vector-Autoregression (VAR) model and find that the optimal lag-length is one for the HQC and BIC of two 
for the AIC (see Table A.1 in the appendix). 
Next, using the optimal lag-length of two lags and running the trace test, we find that on the 5% level, there are four significant 
cointegration equilibrium relationships. The results are reported in Table 3.9 
Since Bitcoin dominates the non-privacy cryptocurrency market, it would be useful to understand how the results are affected when 
adding Bitcoin to our sample. Adding Bitcoin to our set of cryptocurrencies and re-running the trace test, we find that including Bitcoin 
does not alter our main result (see Table 4); still there is evidence of four cointegration equilibria in the sample. Hence, our conclusions 
remain unchanged. While earlier studies found cointegration relationships in traditional currency markets (Norrbin, 1996; Woo, 1999; 
Haug et al., 2000; Rangvid and Sørensen, 2002; Aroskar et al., 2004) our novel findings suggest the presence of cointegration equilibria 
even in new digital currency markets. 
Table 5 
Vector-Error Correction model estimates using all 20 cryptocurrencies excluding Bitcoin.  
i Coins β̂1,i  β̂2,i  β̂3,i  β̂4,i  α̂1,i  α̂2,i  α̂3,i  α̂4,i  
1 XRP(¡1)  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 − 0.0038 − 0.0186***  0.0141*  0.0020    
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) (¡0.4440) (¡2.5970)  (1.6730)  (0.3506) 
2 DASH(¡1)  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0111 − 0.0005  − 0.0030  0.0156***    
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) (1.6430) (¡0.0812)  (¡0.4512)  (3.352) 
3 NMC(¡1)  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000 0.0180* 0.0076  − 0.0187*  0.0218***    
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) (1.6900) (0.8479)  (¡1.769)  (2.975) 
4 PXI(¡1)  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000 − 0.0024 0.0217  0.0657***  − 0.0649***    
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) (¡0.1158) (1.2260)  (3.1520)  (− 4.5020) 
5 LTC(¡1)  − 0.22378  0.25449  − 0.3565*  − 1.2630*** 0.0094 − 0.0064  − 0.0048  0.0193***    
(− 0.6291)  (0.5822)  (− 1.6127)  (− 3.8480) (1.4610) (− 1.1890)  (− 0.7491)  (4.3810) 
6 BCN(¡1)  0.6816***  − 0.4986  − 1.0800***  − 1.2040*** 0.0498*** 0.0241**  0.0660***  0.0147*    
(2.6323)  (− 1.5670)  (− 6.7180)  (− 5.0368) (3.9960) (2.2860)  (5.3260)  (1.7130) 
7 ETH(¡1)  0.1403  − 0.5074*  0.1487  0.7983*** 0.0176** 0.0120**  0.0165**  0.0005    
(0.5667)  (− 1.6679)  (0.9668)  (3.4939) (2.4650) (2.0000)  (2.3310)  (0.0930) 
8 XMR(¡1)  2.7010***  − 2.4470***  − 1.0580***  − 2.4440*** 0.0253*** 0.0133**  0.0022  0.0132**    
(7.7472)  (− 5.7110)  (− 4.8846)  (− 7.5971) (3.1810) (1.9850)  (0.2730)  (2.4090) 
9 DOGE(¡1)  − 0.2443  − 0.2423  − 0.4449**  0.7019** 0.0365*** 0.0127*  0.0236***  0.0064    
(− 0.7941)  (− 0.6409)  (− 2.3270)  (2.4723) (4.7090) (1.9390)  (3.0690)  (1.2100) 
10 XDN(¡1)  − 1.3143***  1.9534***  − 0.0193  − 0.7147*** 0.0660*** 0.0032  0.0019  0.0466***    
(− 5.429)  (6.5663)  (− 0.1281)  (− 3.1993) (5.7470) (0.3348)  (0.1648)  (5.8950) 
11 PPC(¡1)  0.4894  − 3.0200***  − 0.7198***  − 1.8360*** 0.0420*** 0.0276***  0.0127*  0.0183***    
(1.2068)  (− 6.0611)  (− 2.8568)  (− 4.9070) (5.4370) (4.2350)  (1.6530)  (3.4450) 
12 CLOAK(¡1)  − 0.12281  0.3844*  0.1176  0.3329** − 0.0163 − 0.0138  − 0.0140  − 0.0073    
(− 0.7380)  (1.8797)  (1.1370)  (2.1681) (− 1.0640) (− 1.0690)  (− 0.9187)  (− 0.6890) 
13 BTS(¡1)  − 0.6809**  0.46371  0.6770***  1.3303*** 0.0327*** 0.0180**  0.0274***  − 0.0103*    
(− 2.1728)  (1.2042)  (3.4764)  (4.6004) (3.6690) (2.3950)  (3.0940)  (− 1.6760) 
14 AEON(¡1)  − 0.9784***  0.7939***  0.1772  1.0691*** 0.0487*** 0.0315***  0.0123  − 0.0064    
(− 4.1714)  (2.7546)  (1.2160)  (4.9397) (3.8170) (2.9310)  (0.9696)  (− 0.7280) 
15 XLM(¡1)  0.0170  0.4911*  0.5639***  0.5981** − 0.0031 − 0.0268***  − 0.0055  0.0145**    
(0.0783)  (1.8431)  (4.1814)  (2.9892) (− 0.3247) (− 3.3150)  (− 0.3150)  (2.1960) 
16 NAV(¡1)  − 1.0730***  0.1297  1.1108***  1.2463*** 0.0613*** 0.0273**  − 0.0288**  0.0048    
(− 5.0319)  (0.4953)  (8.3859)  (6.3364) (4.2940) (2.2660)  (− 2.0240)  (0.4846) 
17 NXT(¡1)  0.4986**  − 0.0981  − 0.0193  − 0.2720 0.0087 − 0.0043  0.0006  0.0076    
(2.4449)  (− 0.3914)  (− 0.1526)  (− 1.4451) (0.9944) (− 0.5809)  (0.0663)  (1.2640) 
18 XVG(¡1)  − 0.0340  − 0.4594**  0.0723  0.0919 0.1073*** 0.0538***  0.0588***  − 0.0081    
(− 0.2168)  (− 2.3863)  (0.7427)  (0.6356) (6.4200) (3.8140)  (3.5350)  (− 0.7020) 
19 MAID(¡1)  − 0.5737*  1.4236***  − 0.1705  − 0.2948 0.0030 − 0.0061  − 0.0144*  0.0121**    
(− 1.7481)  (3.5305)  (− 0.8360)  (− 0.9736) (0.3909) (− 0.9620)  (− 1.9150)  (2.3350) 
20 XST(¡1)  0.4933***  − 0.5072**  − 0.3578***  − 0.2360 0.0183 0.0071  0.0278*  0.0007    
(2.6938)  (− 2.2542)  (− 3.1445)  (− 1.3968) (1.2540) (0.5770)  (1.9190)  (0.0690) 
Note: This table reports the estimates for a fully specified Vector-Error-Correction Model using all twenty cryptocurrencies in our sample excluding 
Bitcoin. Our model uses daily data of log prices. The model has a lag-order of p = 2. We report the estimates for the matrix β and the estimates for the 
adjustment parameter matrix α. The model allows for linear deterministic trend in data. The corresponding t-statistics are given in parentheses. The 
model is estimated with the econometric software Gretl. The sample period is from January 1, 2016 until December 31, 2018 corresponding to 1096 
observations. Log-likelihood (lu) = 42519.662. 
*Statistically significant on a 10% level. 
** Statistically significant on a 5% level. 
*** Statistically significant on a 1% level. 
9 We decided to use two lags for the VECM specifications because testing for the optimal lag length in the VAR model representation suggests 
according to the AIC a lag-order of 2. The corresponding results are reported in Table A.1 in the appendix. Furthermore, the trend in data levels of 
non-privacy and privacy coins are reported in Fig. A.1 and Fig. A.2 in the appendix, which suggests to estimate the fully unrestricted VECM. 
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Establishing the existence of four cointegration relationships makes it possible to estimate the reduced form of model (3) using αβ’ 
where the dimension of α and β is 20x4. To test our hypothesis of interest, we order the vector yt− 1 as, 
yt− 1= (XRPt− 1,DASHt− 1,NMCt− 1,PXIt− 1, LTCt− 1,BCNt− 1,ETHt− 1,XMRt− 1,DODGEt− 1,XDNt− 1,⋯  
PPCt− 1,CLOAKt− 1,BTSt− 1,AEONt− 1,XMLt− 1,NAVt− 1,NXTt− 1,XVGt− 1,MAIDt− 1,XSTt− 1)
The chosen ordering implies for the normalized matrix β that, 
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Restricted Vector-Error Correction model estimates using all 20 cryptocurrencies (excluding Bitcoin).  
i Coins β̂1,i  β̂2,i  β̂3,i  β̂4,i  α̂1,i  α̂2,i  α̂3,i  α̂4,i  
1 XRP(¡1)  4.9650  23.8620 − 4.4180  1.0840  0.0020*  0.0003  0.0037*** − 0.0038***        
(1.9370)  (1.2750)  (3.6500) (− 4.0660) 
2 DASH(¡1)  1.4050  20.3200 − 5.4600  2.2000  0.0030***  − 0.0002  0.0004 0.0007        
(3.6390)  (− 1.0270)  (0.4767) (0.9418) 
3 NMC(¡1)  1.0470  − 37.6080 − 6.7530  − 12.7680  0.0026  − 0.0002  − 0.0011 0.0033        
(1.9660)  (− 0.6535)  (− 0.8434) (2.8370) 
4 PXI(¡1)  3.9350  8.8340 2.9110  5.0080  − 0.0065**  0.0013**  − 0.0027 − 0.0083***        
(− 2.512)  (2.5550)  (− 1.0790) (− 3.5770) 
5 LTC(¡1)  − 6.1150  0.0000 − 1.8420  − 1.8950  0.0036***  − 0.0002  0.0014* 0.0004        
(4.5920)  (− 1.1500)  (1.8660) (0.5406) 
6 BCN(¡1)  − 3.3150  31.2420 3.1460  6.5820  0.0102***  0.00002  − 0.0018 − 0.0038***        
(6.6300)  (0.0573)  (− 1.1860) (− 2.7810) 
7 ETH(¡1)  3.3910  0.0000 3.8950  2.1490  0.0021**  0.0001  − 0.0014 − 0.0012        
(2.3520)  (0.3820)  (− 1.6150) (− 1.2890) 
8 XMR(¡1)  − 0.0490  66.3660 4.0290  4.8860  0.0032***  − 0.00001  − 0.0015 0.0009        
(3.2910)  (− 0.0275)  (− 1.6250) (0.9700) 
9 DOGE(¡1)  0.4290  0.0000 6.5460  6.3010  0.0043***  0.0007***  − 0.0004 − 0.0030***        
(4.4830)  (3.4680)  (− 0.4156) (− 3.5040) 
10 XDN(¡1)  − 7.3700  − 33.2890 − 9.5790  − 7.0180  0.0107***  0.0008***  0.0023* − 0.0021        
(7.5970)  (2.7990)  (1.6880) (− 1.6080) 
11 PPC(¡1)  − 8.9510  0.0000 16.8170  0.8960  0.0054***  − 0.0002  − 0.0035*** 0.0016*        
(5.6730)  (− 0.6052)  (− 3.8050) (1.8640) 
12 CLOAK(¡1)  1.0890  − 9.6940 − 2.3870  − 1.5050  − 0.0032*  0.0004  0.0021 − 0.0005        
(− 1.7080)  (1.1300)  (1.1330) (− 0.2703) 
13 BTS(¡1)  3.6980  0.0000 1.3240  1.9320  0.0014  0.0009***  − 0.0014 − 0.0042***        
(1.2850)  (3.9260)  (− 1.3380) (− 4.2180) 
14 AEON(¡1)  0.2140  − 24.6440 0.3550  0.1280  0.0007  0.0012***  − 0.0034** − 0.0021        
(0.4381)  (3.7950)  (− 2.2330) (− 1.4560) 
15 XLM(¡1)  3.8690  0.0000 − 4.4170  − 2.1640  0.0027**  0.0002  0.0049*** − 0.0028***        
(2.3080)  (0.8360)  (4.3380) (− 2.6010) 
16 NAV(¡1)  1.1000  − 44.8930 0.8390  − 7.1840  − 0.0006  0.0018***  − 0.0024 − 0.0010        
(− 0.3513)  (4.9360)  (− 1.4310) (− 0.6023) 
17 NXT(¡1)  1.0430  0.0000 − 2.9420  − 2.2270  0.0018*  0.0002  0.0013 − 0.0011        
(1.6780)  (1.0550)  (1.2040) (− 1.0840) 
18 XVG(¡1)  − 0.2140  − 3.2080 3.1300  0.1480  0.0063***  0.0026***  − 0.0042** − 0.0090***        
(3.0350)  (6.0900)  (− 2.1000) (− 4.8370) 
19 MAID(¡1)  − 2.5510  0.0000 − 6.4290  − 0.3290  0.0012  − 0.0001  0.0010 0.0009        
(1.2400)  (− 0.4403)  (1.1520) (1.0200) 
20 XST(¡1)  0.5260  16.4420 2.5880  3.4220  0.0032*  0.0003  − 0.0001 − 0.0026        
(1.7580)  (0.7125)  (− 0.0739) (− 1.5830) 
Note: This table reports the estimates for a restricted Vector-Error-Correction Model using the set of all cryptocurrencies that are endogenous. Our 
model uses daily data of log prices. The model has a lag-order of p = 2. We report the estimates for the matrix β and the estimates for the adjustment 
parameter matrix α. The model allows for linear deterministic trend in data. The corresponding t-statistics for the adjustment parameter matrix α are 
given in parentheses. The model is estimated with the econometric software Gretl. The sample period is from January 1, 2016 until December 31, 
2018 corresponding to 1096 observations. Unrestricted loglikelihood (lu) = 42519.662, Restricted loglikelihood (lr) = 42518.064, 2 * (lu - lr) =
3.19601, P(Chi-square(5) > 3.19601) = 0.669797. 
* Statistically significant on a 10% level. 
** Statistically significant on a 5% level. 
*** Statistically significant on a 1% level. 
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where βk with k = {1,⋯, 4} are parameter vectors that have the dimension 20x1. Specifically, in our ordering we selected those 
cryptocurrencies that have the highest and lowest market capitalization in both categories, privacy coins (i.e., DASH and PXI) and non- 
privacy coins (i.e., XRP and NMC) as the ones to be explained by the remaining cryptocurrencies. This approach allows us to identify 
whether the liquidity of cryptocurrencies matters for the formation of submarkets. Next, using our normalized matrix β, we estimated a 
fully specified VECM using again all twenty cryptocurrencies. Since we are interested in the cointegration equilibria, we report only the 
point estimates for the matrices α and β, respectively. The results are reported in Table 5. 
Table 5 reveals some interesting results. First, the privacy coin market defined by PXI, which is in terms of market capitalization the 
smallest cryptocurrency investigated here, and defined by, 
β4’
(
yt− 1 − μ0,4 − μ1,4(t − 1)
)
seven out of eight non-privacy coins entering the cointegration equilibrium exhibit t-statistics indicating statistical significance on at 
least a 5% level. This result implies that the submarket defined here is not a submarket detached from the market for non-privacy coins. 
Second, the privacy coin market defined by DASH, which is in terms of its market capitalization the largest cryptocurrency investigated 
here, and defined by, 
β2’
(
yt− 1 − μ0,2 − μ1,2(t − 1)
)
only two out of eight non-privacy coins entering the cointegration equilibrium exhibit t-statistics indicating statistical significance on 
at least a 5% level. This result could indicate that this submarket defined is potentially detached from the market for non-privacy coins. 
To test whether the submarket of privacy coins, defined by β2’
(
yt− 1 − μ0,2 − μ1,2(t − 1)
)
is detached from the market for non-privacy 
coins, we set the following restrictions: β2,5 = 0, β2,7 = 0, β2,9 = 0, β2,11 = 0, β2,13 = 0, β2,15 = 0, β2,17 = 0, β2,19 = 0 and then re- 
estimate the VECM. Note that the imposed restrictions imply that all eight non-privacy coins are set equal to zero and the equilib-
rium is formed by privacy coins only. Note also that our normalization accounts for β2,1 = 0 and β2,3 = 0 (i.e., β2,XRP = 0 and β2,NMC =
0) in the original model specification. The point estimates for α and β for the restricted model are reported in Table 6. 
The log-likelihood of the unrestricted model (Table 5) is 42519.66, whereas the log-likelihood of the unrestricted model is 
42518.06. Employing the Likelihood-Ratio (LR) test gives us an estimated value of, 
λ̂ = 2(42519.66 − 42518.06) = 3.20 < 11.07 = χ20.95 (5) 
Since the estimated test statistic is clearly below the critical value of the corresponding reference distribution under null hypothesis 
Fig. 1. This figure shows the cointegration equilibrium for privacy coins. The sample period is from January 1, 2016 until December 31, 2018 
corresponding to 1096 observations. 
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which is chi-square distributed with five degrees of freedom, we cannot reject the null hypothesis (p-value 0.6698). This result implies 
that the privacy coin market, as defined by β2’
(
yt− 1 − μ0,2 − μ1,2(t − 1)
)
fulfills the conditions of a statistical equilibrium which is indeed 
detached from the market for non-privacy coins. In Fig. 1 we plot the cointegration equilibria βk’(yt− 1 − μ0 − μ1(t − 1) ) for = {1,⋯, 4}, 
where k = 2 defines our cointegration equilibrium for privacy coins. We observe from Fig. 1 that the cointegration equilibrium for 
privacy coins shows a clear linear stationary trend which underpins the necessity to employ a fully specified VECM accounting for both 
constant and trend term (see Equation (3)). 
Next, we have shown that adding Bitcoin to our set of coins and re-running the trace test provided evidence that the system of 
equations still generated four cointegration equilibria. To test the robustness of our results, we again add Bitcoin to our sample so that 
yt− 1 is now a 21x1 vector given by 
yt− 1= (XRPt− 1,DASHt− 1,NMCt− 1,PXIt− 1, LTCt− 1,BCNt− 1,ETHt− 1,XMRt− 1,DODGEt− 1,XDNt− 1,⋯  
PPCt− 1,CLOAKt− 1,BTSt− 1,AEONt− 1,XMLt− 1,NAVt− 1,NXTt− 1,XVGt− 1,MAIDt− 1,XSTt− 1,BTCt− 1)
Since we are interested in the cointegration equilibria, we again report only the point estimates for the matrices α and β, 
Table 7 
Vector-Error Correction model estimates using all 21 cryptocurrencies (including Bitcoin).  
i Coins β̂1,i  β̂2,i  β̂3,i  β̂4,i  α̂1,i  α̂2,i  α̂3,i  α̂4,i  
1 XRP(¡1)  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 − 0.0076 − 0.0172**  0.0004  0.0076    
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) (− 0.870) (− 2.1270)  (0.0613)  (1.4020) 
2 DASH(¡1)  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0025 − 0.0036  − 0.0008  0.0153***    
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.3580) (− 0.5500)  (− 0.1675)  (3.5430) 
3 NMC(¡1)  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000 − 0.0015 0.0091  − 0.0024  0.0146    
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) (− 0.1372) (0.8872)  (− 0.3147)  (2.1390) ** 
4 PXI(¡1)  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000 0.0292 0.0255  0.0324**  − 0.0524***    
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) (1.3410) (1.2660)  (2.1740)  (− 3.8890) 
5 LTC(¡1)  − 3.2199***  0.8418***  3.1825***  0.2241 0.0090 − 0.0097  0.0011  0.0170***    
(− 5.4338)  (2.7834)  (3.1956)  (0.6288) (1.3500) (− 1.5790)  (0.2422)  (4.1440) 
6 BCN(¡1)  − 0.1283  − 0.0653  − 0.3487  − 0.6140*** 0.0715*** 0.0272**  0.0429***  0.0184**    
(− 0.3555)  (− 0.3546)  (− 0.5747)  (− 2.8271) (5.5220) (2.2730)  (4.8310)  (2.3010) 
7 ETH(¡1)  0.4228  − 0.5460***  − 0.1801  0.7983*** 0.0119* 0.0150**  0.0108**  0.0021    
(1.2135)  (− 3.0696)  (− 0.3076)  (3.1123) (1.6120) (2.1920)  (2.1300)  (0.4621) 
8 XMR(¡1)  − 0.9931**  − 1.1750***  3.0670***  − 0.6145** 0.0053 0.0143*  0.0064  0.0096*    
(− 2.0396)  (− 4.7280)  (3.7483)  (− 2.0980) (0.6446) (1.8750)  (1.1320)  (1.8870) 
9 DOGE(¡1)  − 1.4630***  − 0.02607  1.0270  1.2550*** 0.0385*** 0.0114  0.0256***  0.0069    
(− 3.4138)  (− 0.1192)  (1.4259)  (4.8685) (4.7920) (1.5390)  (4.6610)  (1.3840) 
10 XDN(¡1)  1.3271***  0.9191***  − 2.8790***  − 2.0910*** 0.0533*** − 0.0002  0.0301***  0.0383***    
(3.9482)  (5.3576)  (− 5.0964)  (− 10.3413) (4.4480) (− 0.0224)  (3.6660)  (5.1720) 
11 PPC(¡1)  0.0423  − 2.5830***  − 0.2824  − 1.7190*** 0.0303*** 0.0309***  0.0176***  0.0165***    
(0.0738)  (− 8.8348)  (− 0.2934)  (− 4.9881) (3.7830) (4.1750)  (3.2110)  (3.3290) 
12 CLOAK(¡1)  − 1.2639***  0.4614***  1.5613***  0.8283*** 0.0061 − 0.0192  − 0.0019  − 0.0086    
(− 4.8640)  (3.4794)  (3.5751)  (5.2993) (0.3853) (− 1.3120)  (− 0.1792)  (− 0.8799) 
13 BTS(¡1)  2.0520***  − 0.1234  − 2.5420***  0.0164 0.0281*** 0.0179**  0.0255***  − 0.0083    
(4.2823)  (− 0.5041)  (− 3.1560)  (0.0568) (3.0490) (2.1030)  (4.0430)  (− 1.4530) 
14 AEON(¡1)  − 0.6005*  0.4365***  − 0.10107  0.8054*** 0.0378*** 0.0318***  0.0317***  − 0.0139*    
(− 1.7821)  (2.5380)  (− 0.1785)  (3.9733) (2.8540) (2.5940)  (3.4890)  (− 1.690) 
15 XLM(¡1)  − 1.0560***  0.7228***  1.8220***  1.1150*** − 0.0086 − 0.0339***  − 0.0047  0.0142**    
(− 3.3453)  (4.4880)  (3.4360)  (5.8756) (− 0.8655) (− 3.6870)  (− 0.6872)  (2.3100) 
16 NAV(¡1)  − 0.7261***  0.0948**  1.5061***  0.2218 − 0.0013 0.0247*  0.0212**  − 0.0204**    
(− 5.3674)  (2.0063)  (4.2492)  (0.0271) (− 0.0883) (1.7890)  (2.0720)  (− 2.2070) 
17 NXT(¡1)  − 0.7261**  0.0948  1.5061***  0.2218 0.0029 − 0.0086  0.0024  0.0073    
(− 2.3679)  (0.6059)  (2.9224)  (1.2024) (0.3190) (− 1.0270)  (0.3853)  (1.2960) 
18 XVG(¡1)  1.0755***  − 0.4860***  − 1.3560***  − 0.3850*** 0.0789*** 0.0526***  0.0706***  − 0.0123    
(4.7743)  (− 4.2275)  (− 3.5814)  (− 2.8405) (4.5510) (3.2800)  (5.9410)  (− 1.1450) 
19 MAID(¡1)  − 1.1073**  1.2521***  0.57559  − 0.04574 − 0.0048 − 0.0093  − 0.0051  0.0099**    
(− 2.3552)  (5.2182)  (0.7284)  (− 0.1617) (− 0.6112) (− 1.2850)  (− 0.9578)  (2.0560) 
20 XST(¡1)  − 2.0344***  0.0583  2.6091***  0.9837*** 0.0508*** 0.0029  0.0246**  0.0041    
(− 7.4054)  (0.4159)  (5.6501)  (5.9526) (3.3790) (0.2049)  (2.3910)  (0.4403) 
21 BTC(¡1)  4.3059***  − 1.1047***  − 5.0060***  − 2.0850*** 0.0056 0.0050  0.0030  0.0127    
(6.3630)  (− 3.1986)  (− 4.4017)  (− 5.1220) (1.2340) (1.1780)  (0.9537)  (4.4910) 
Note: This table reports the estimates for a fully specified Vector-Error-Correction Model using all twenty-one cryptocurrencies in our sample 
including Bitcoin. Our model uses daily data of log prices. The model has a lag-order of p = 2. We report the estimates for the matrix β and the 
estimates for the adjustment parameter matrix α. The model allows for linear deterministic trend in data. The corresponding t-statistics are given in 
parentheses. The model is estimated with the econometric software Gretl. The sample period is from January 1, 2016 until December 31, 2018 
corresponding to 1096 observations. Log-likelihood(lu) = 45873.105 
*Statistically significant on a 10% level. 
** Statistically significant on a 5% level. 
*** Statistically significant on a 1% level. 
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respectively. The results are reported in Table 7. 
Again, we normalized the matrix β which is now of dimension 21x4, and the choose the same ordering as before, that is, 
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where βk with k = {1,⋯,4} are parameter vectors that have the dimension 21x1. Again, we test whether the submarket of privacy 
coins, defined by β2’
(
yt− 1 − μ0,2 − μ1,2(t − 1)
)
is detached from the market for non-privacy coins by re-estimating the VECM using the 
Table 8 
Restricted Vector-Error Correction model estimates using all 21 cryptocurrencies (including Bitcoin).  
i Coins β̂1,i  β̂2,i  β̂3,i  β̂4,i  α̂1,i  α̂2,i  α̂3,i  α̂4,i  
1 XRP(¡1)  2.7920 − 23.7910  0.2950  3.6640  0.0031*** − 0.0001  0.0010  0.0012        
(2.9240) (− 0.3261)  (0.9609)  (1.2960) 
2 DASH(¡1)  0.6610 − 19.1560  − 5.4660  0.2790  0.0033*** 0.0001  0.0003  − 0.0005        
(4.0070) (0.8537)  (0.3134)  (− 0.6296) 
3 NMC(¡1)  0.1800 31.0960  − 3.9900  12.3180  0.0029** 0.00003  − 0.0018  − 0.0023**        
(2.186) (0.1268)  (− 1.3880)  (− 2.025) 
4 PXI(¡1)  4.3980 − 7.8020  2.3050  − 3.9460  − 0.0076*** − 0.0011**  − 0.0012  0.0071***        
(− 3.0060) (− 2.1690)  (− 0.4614)  (3.1430) 
5 LTC(¡1)  − 3.6900 0.0000  − 8.8260  − 4.0540  0.0034*** 0.0001  0.0018**  0.0002        
(4.2730) (0.4629)  (2.3360)  (0.3161) 
6 BCN(¡1)  − 2.7300 − 26.8060  1.7350  − 7.4520  0.0079*** − 0.0005  − 0.0001  0.0070***        
(5.1460) (− 1.5720)  (− 0.0748)  (5.2810) 
7 ETH(¡1)  3.4570 0.0000  4.7460  − 1.3560  0.0022** − 0.0001  − 0.0020**  0.0012        
(2.4650) (− 0.4883)  (− 2.3180)  (1.6270) 
8 XMR(¡1)  − 1.4310 − 64.3710  4.3720  − 4.8660  0.0034*** − 0.00008  − 0.0026***  − 0.0003        
(3.5030) (− 0.42620)  (− 2.6420)  (− 0.3547) 
9 DOGE(¡1)  2.6610 0.0000  1.7870  − 9.1560  0.0035*** − 0.0008***  0.0006  0.0036***        
(3.6700) (− 4.0000)  (0.5781)  (4.3010) 
10 XDN(¡1)  − 8.5870 33.4290  − 6.7550  8.2280  0.0099*** − 0.0011***  0.0028*  0.0029**        
(7.0250) (− 3.8160)  (1.9610)  (2.3340) 
11 PPC(¡1)  − 8.0090 0.0000  14.2560  − 7.3220  0.0051*** − 0.0001  − 0.0032***  0.0006        
(5.3590) (− 0.6383)  (− 3.3300)  (0.7335) 
12 CLOAK(¡1)  1.6940 10.7940  − 4.2270  1.0230  − 0.0042** − 0.0005  0.0047**  0.0004        
(− 2.2340) (− 1.2590)  (2.5280)  (0.2280) 
13 BTS(¡1)  2.8940 0.0000  4.3040  1.1000  0.0011 − 0.0008***  − 0.0012  0.0037***        
(0.9834) (− 3.7300)  (− 1.1370)  (3.8850) 
14 AEON(¡1)  1.5060 24.8650  − 1.8870  − 1.1170  − 0.0006 − 0.0013***  − 0.0021  0.0030**        
(− 0.3696) (− 4.2610)  (− 1.3250)  (2.2220) 
15 XLM(¡1)  3.9810 0.0000  − 5.6250  2.8620  0.0032*** − 0.0001  0.0038***  0.0007        
(2.6700) (− 0.3685)  (3.2000)  (0.6931) 
16 NAV(¡1)  1.1950 39.9050  3.0150  6.6620  − 0.0010 − 0.0018***  − 0.0047***  0.00003        
(− 0.5785) (− 5.1130)  (− 2.6730)  (0.0217) 
17 NXT(¡1)  0.4050 0.0000  − 2.7740  2.9580  0.0019* − 0.0002  0.0012  0.0006        
(1.7750) (− 0.9222)  (1.0740)  (0.5848) 
18 XVG(¡1)  − 0.4000 1.6220  4.2720  − 0.2050  0.0049** − 0.0025***  − 0.0039*  0.0087***        
(2.3800) (− 6.2330)  (− 1.9210)  (4.8620) 
19 MAID(¡1)  − 1.9200 0.0000  − 8.4200  − 0.4170  0.0013 − 0.0005  0.0037  0.0047        
(1.6440) (0.6050)  (1.0090)  (− 1.2690) 
20 XST(¡1)  1.8850 − 14.8190  − 1.4020  − 5.6850  0.0013 − 0.0005  0.0037**  0.0047***        
(0.7027) (− 1.4040)  (2.1020)  (3.0230) 
21 BTC(¡1)  − 3.1250 0.0000  9.9740  5.4360  0.0032*** 0.00001  − 0.0009  − 0.0004        
(5.9210) (0.0585)  (− 1.5900)  (− 0.8382) 
Note: This table reports the estimates for a restricted Vector-Error-Correction Model using the set of all cryptocurrencies that are endogenous 
including Bitcoin. Our model uses daily data of log prices. The model has a lag-order of p = 2. We report the estimates for the matrix β and the 
estimates for the adjustment parameter matrix α. The model allows for linear deterministic trend in data. The corresponding t-statistics for the 
adjustment parameter matrix α are given in parentheses. The model is estimated with the econometric software Gretl. The sample period is from 
January 1, 2016 until December 31, 2018 corresponding to 1096 observations. Unrestricted loglikelihood (lu) = 45873.105, Restricted loglikelihood 
(lr) = 45869.056, 2 * (lu - lr) = 8.09739, P(Chi-square (6) > 8.09739) = 0.231055 
* Statistically significant on a 10% level. 
** Statistically significant on a 5% level. 
*** Statistically significant on a 1% level. 
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following restrictions: β2,5 = 0, β2,7 = 0, β2,9 = 0, β2,11 = 0, β2,13 = 0, β2,15 = 0, β2,17 = 0, β2,19 = 0, and additionally β2,21 = 0. The 
imposed restrictions imply that all nine non-privacy coins including Bitcoin are set equal to zero, which means that the equilibrium is 
formed by privacy coins only. Note again that our chosen normalization accounts for β2,1 = 0 and β2,3 = 0 (e.g., β2,XRP = 0 and 
β2,NMC = 0) in the original model specification. The point estimates for α and β for the restricted model are reported in Table 8. 
The log-likelihood of the unrestricted model (Table 7) is 45873.11, whereas the log-likelihood of the unrestricted restricted model 
is 45869.06. Employing the Likelihood-Ratio (LR) test gives us an estimated value of 
λ̂ = 2(45873.11 − 45869.06) = 8.10 < 12.59 = χ20.95 (6) 
Since the estimated test statistic is below the critical value of the corresponding reference distribution under null hypothesis which 
is chi-square distributed with six degrees of freedom, we cannot reject the null hypothesis (p-value 0.2311). This result implies that 
despite of accounting for Bitcoin as the cryptocurrency that exhibits the highest market capitalization the privacy coin market, as 
defined by β2’
(
yt− 1 − μ0,2 − μ1,2(t − 1)
)
fulfills the conditions of a statistical equilibrium. This statistical equilibrium is detached from 
the market for non-privacy coins. Hence, the results of our robustness check strongly confirms our previous findings. 
5. Conclusion 
Goldfeder et al. (2018) show how third-party web trackers can de-anonymize users of Bitcoin and other non-privacy coins. Due to 
financial transparency, institutions are hesitant to use non-privacy cryptocurrencies as a medium of exchange. The emerge of privacy 
coins remedies this issue by using features like masternode technology, ring signature, and a stealth wallet address, to make it 
impossible for third parties to trace transactions to the real parties involved. We hypothesized that the traders, who favor privacy over 
complete transparency, are emerging as a different subgroup in digital financial markets. A common feature of cryptocurrencies is that 
the total supply of cryptocurrencies is often predetermined. As a consequence, the price processes depend solely on the demand side, 
that is, the users. Given that the user base for privacy coins is different from that for non-privacy coins, we would expect that privacy 
coins form a submarket of cryptocurrencies that is detached from the market for non-privacy coins. 
To explore this issue, we make use of cointegration analysis which has at least three benefits; first, we can test whether the market 
for privacy coins generates a cointegration equilibrium that is detached from the market for non-privacy coins. Second, given that a 
cointegration equilibrium exists, the model allows us to test at the same for market efficiency. Third, and finally, making use of this 
model has the advantage that is does not require the specific formulation of an equilibrium price mechanism. Using the whole set of 
cryptocurrencies consisting of twenty cryptocurrencies to estimate the model, we find evidence for four cointegration equilibria. 
Accounting for liquidity, we estimate a fully-specified VECM by selecting the privacy and non-privacy coins with highest and lowest 
market capitalization as the four left-hand side variables in the model. Whereas in the equation modeling the privacy coin with lowest 
market capitalization (PXI) enter both categories of cryptocurrencies, that is, privacy and non-privacy coins, in the equation modeling 
DASH, which is the privacy coin with highest market capitalization, only two of non-privacy coins entering the equation exhibit 
statistical significance. Performing a Likelihood-Ratio test, we find that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the whole set of non- 
privacy coins is jointly insignificant. 
First, an immediate implication of cointegration is the existence of Granger-causal orderings among cointegrated series, which 
implies that asset prices determined in a weakly efficient market cannot be cointegrated. Hence, our findings provide evidence for 
market inefficiency. Second, the cointegration equilibrium associated with DASH appears to be disconnected from the market for non- 
privacy coins. A novel aspect of our study is it providing evidence that the underlying forces that cause large cap privacy coins 
equilibrium are unrelated to those at work in the non-privacy coins market. One explanation could be behavioral type: It could be that 
the market actors in the privacy coin market are different from those that trade in the non-privacy coin market. For instance, criminals 
involved in money laundry could favor privacy coins exhibiting a high level of liquidity as the sums involved could be substantial 
making small cap privacy coins an inappropriate choice for money laundry. 
However, future studies might explore the market heterogeneity in the cryptocurrency market in more detail. Also, potential factors 
that might have caused the cointegration relationships should be the subject of future research. Third, if the stable cointegration 
relationship between asset prices is known to the market participants they would be able to exploit it and be in a position to profit. 
There is a broad stream of literature dealing with pairs trading, for instance, that requires the presence of cointegrated assets. Future 
research investigating this issue in the context of new digital currency markets would be welcome. Finally, since cryptocurrencies are 
by definition privy of intrinsic value - unlike fiat money issued by governments - the extent to which shocks may propagate across 
cryptocurrencies raises questions as to whether any observed spillover stems from investors’ rebalancing activity and the accompa-
nying price pressures rather than from fundamental information transmission. Future research is needed to elaborate on these 
mechanisms. 
Declaration of Competing Interest 
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to 
influence the work reported in this paper. 
N. Sapkota and K. Grobys                                                                                                                                                                                           
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions & Money 74 (2021) 101402
14
Appendix A   
Fig. A1. Trend in the data levels of top 10 non-privacy coins 2016–2018(excluding Bitcoin).  
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Fig. A2. Trend in the data levels of top 10 privacy coins 2016–2018.  
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Appendix B. Supplementary material 
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intfin.2021.101402. 
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